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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
li'RANCES O'HAIR, 
Plaintiff-A ppeUant, 
- vs. -
JOHN S. KOUNALIS and 
GEORGE KOUNALIS, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
Case No. 
11445 
APP'ELLANT'S BRIEF. 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
Plaintiff seeks to recover loans made by her to 
defendants on oral agreements and not fully repaid. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Defendant's motion for summary judgment of dis-
missal of plaintiff's complaint was granted on the sole 
ground that the statute of limitations had run. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the summary judgment 
and trial on the merits. 
1 
STATEMENT OFF AGTS 
Because this is an appeal from a summary judg-
ment, the facts alleged by plaintiff in her pleadings and 
deposition will be set forth, even though some of them 
are denied by defendants. 
Plaintiff was orphaned at age 14, and resided until 
age 18 at her parents home in Salt Lake City, Utah, 
with her older sister and a Mrs. Leone Small, who had 
been hired as housekeeper for the girls by their guardian. 
Mrs. Small was mother-in-law of defendant John Kou-
nalis, hereafter referred to as "John." (Pltf. depos. p. 4, 
L. 17 - p. 5, L. 23) vVhen plaintiff became 18, in 1962, 
the home was sold and she received $11,000.00 as her 
share of her mother's estate. (Pltf. depos. p. 8, L. 4 - 14) 
Mrs. Small then returned to live at the home of John 
Kounalis, his wife and his younger, single brother, de-
fendant George Kounalis, hereafter ref erred to as 
"George." During her four year association with Mrs. 
Small, plaintiff had become very close to the Kounalis 
clan and considered them as her "family." She even 
moved into an apartment next door to the Kounalis 
home when her parents home was sold. In July 1962, 
George was arrested and charged in Federal Court in 
San Diego, California with a felony. His attorney fee 
was $3,500.00, of which he paid $1,000.00. He also paid 
$1,032.25 in October 1962, to recover his car, which had 
been confiscated, and paid $100.00 in March 1963 to 
settle the fine imposed upon him by the court. (George 
depos. p. 5, L. 24 - p. 6, L. 4; p. 18, L. 2 - 8) 
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The $3,632.24 balance was paid by money advanced 
by plaintiff, on oral agreements, during the period from 
October, 1962, through March, 1963. The transactions 
are best stated in plaintiff's own words in her deposi-
tion at page 11, lines 16-25: 
"A. John was the one that first approached 
me on it. George apparrntly didn't have the 
money, and he was in difficulty. He asked me if 
I \vould consider loaning it to them - John did. 
It was a verbal agreement that it would be repaid 
baek. He said that it might be five or six years, 
hut that it would be repaid. He explained to me 
\Yhat the problem was. I said, 'Fine.' I hap-
pened to have the money and they happened to 
be like family. I was at their home for Christmas 
and Thanksgiving, and they were very nice people. 
And if your friends are in trouble, you try to 
help them; so I just gave them the money." 
Plaintiff reiterated several times in her deposition that 
the loan was made only on John's promise that it would 
he repaid. (Pltf. depos. p. 29, L. 13-15; p. 31, L. 17; 
p. 32, L. 22-25) 
George acknowledges that he received the subject 
money from John. (George depos. p. 17, L. 1-25) John 
acknowledges that he received the money from plaintiff 
and paid it on to George. (John depos. p. 6, L. 20-21) 
The defendants admit only that $2,532.25 was advanced 
tlwm by plaintiff. (John depos. p. 7, L. 8-9) They deny 
an.\' loan, and claim plaintiff made them a gift of the 
mone_\'. (John depos. p. 12, L. 7-21) 
During 1963 and into January, 1964, J olm let plain-
tiff obtain groceries at his store totalling $726.00. He 
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never billed her for them, but did keep all of the tapes. 
(John depos. p. 13, L. 9-15 ; p. 14, L. 20-25) Plaintiff 
claims these were payments on the loan. (Pltf. depos. 
p. 34, L 18; p. 35, L. 9) John claims the $726.00 in 
groceries was his gift to plaintiff. (John depos. p. 18, 
L. 5-19) 
In 1964 George paid plaintiff $100.00, and in 1967 
paid her $50.00. Plaintiff claims these were payments 
on the loan (pltf. depos. p. 29, L. 21-p. 30, L. 6), George 
claims these payments 'vere gifts. (George depos. p. 12, 
L. 17-19; p. 14, L. 1-12) 
On October 27, 1968, plaintiff sued defendants on 
the debts. (R. 1) The filing was five and one-half years 
from the last loan made in March 1963. It was four 
years and seven months from the last payment, free 
groceries, made by John. It was one year from the last 
payment, $50.00, made by George. 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE THERE WAS A 
GENUINE ISSUE OF FACT AS TO WHETHER THE 
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS HAD RUN, WHEN 
PLAINTIFF BROUGHT SUIT SIX YEARS AFTER 
THE LOANS WERE MADE, BUT LESS THAN FOUR 
YEARS AFTER THEY WERE IN DEF AULT 
On plaintiff's motion to set aside the summary judg-
ment, the trial court was asked as to the basis of its 
ruling, so that arguments could be to the point. The 
court replied that its ruling was based solely on the stat-
ute of limitations. (R. 5-6) This appeal concerns itself 
solely with that issue. 
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Plaintiff's loans were made in a period from Octo-
ber 1962 through March 1963. ( Pltf. depos. p. 9, L. 13-25; 
p. 10, L. 2-3) The loans were on oral contract. The 
applicable statute of limitations is four years (78-12-
25 ( 1) PCA, 1953). Plaintiff did not expect repayment 
for about five years. (Pltf. depos. p. 11, L. 16-20; p. 18, 
L. 3-4; p. 28, L. 16-18; p. 29, L. 13-15) 
The issue of law is whether the statute of limitations 
begins to run when a contract is made, or when a con-
tract is in default. The issue of fact is to determine 
the point in time when the loans were in default. If 
this point was within four years of the commencement 
of the lawsuit, then the statue of limitations has not run. 
Holloway v. Wetzel, 86 U. 387, 45 P.2d 565, con-
cerns a written contract with the issue before the court 
'"hether the statute of limitations begins to run on the 
dae of the contract or the date of default. The court 
stated, at 86 U. 391, "This action was commenced August 
22, 1933. The note sued upon is alleged to have become 
due December 12, 1925. It would be barred if no pay-
ments, acknowledgments or new promises were made, 
six years thereafter, being December 12, 1931." The 
case lacks discussion, but clearly states that the date of 
default is the date on which the statute begins to run. 
lt could be argued, that if the date of execution of the 
contract automatically commenced the period of limita-
tions, that no creditor or mortgagee could safely make 
a written contract running more than six years. Cer-
tainly on a long term mortgage, if payments are missed 
at say the eighth year, the statute then begins to run, 
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and this is not because payments have tolled the statute 
' but because until there is an actual default, the statutP 
hasn't begun to run at all. 
01wn account and implied contract cases must lw 
distinguished. In these, the rule is that a short time for 
payment is implied and tlwn the statute starts to run. 
JI orris v. Russell, 120 U. 545, 236 P.2d 451. This n1le is 
based on the assumption that the contract is in defm1lt 
about a month from its execution. In the case at bar 
' the point at which the loans were in default is not clear. 
This is precisely the point 1Yhich should haYe precluded 
the summary judgment. It is analogous, in a sense, to 
cases of misuse of funds by a corporation, or of fraud. 
where the statute does not begin to nm when the im-
proper payment is made, but from the datP of discovery, 
which is analogous to default. Petty & Riddle, Inc. rs. 
Lunt, 104 U. 130, 138 P.2d G4S. In Crofoot v. Thatcher 
and Josselyn, 19 U. 212, 57 P. 171, a demand note for a 
subscription in corporate stock was given. Eight years 
later, the corporation having failed, demand was made 
by the corporate receiYer on the note. On refusal of 
the demand, suit was filed. The court held that the debt 
was not in default, and the statute had not rnn, unhl 
after demand had been made, and denied a defense of 
the statute of limitations. 
The general rule is stated in 34 Am Jur, Limitation 
of Actions, ~113, P. 91: 
"Accrual of cause of action. In General. It 
is of the essence of statutes of limitations that 
time begins to run under them as to causes of 
action only after the right to prosecute them to 
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a successful conclusion has fullv accrued. . . . 
As the rnle is otherwise expre~sed, a right of 
action accrues ·whenever such a breach of duty 
or contract has occurred or such a wrong has 
been sustained, as will give a right to bring and 
sustain a suit. Conversely, the right to commence 
an action arises the moment the cause of action 
accrues. In the absence of a statute to the con-
trary, the test in each case is whether the party 
asserting the claim is entitled to maintain an 
action to enforce it, for no limitation commences 
to nm against any demand until the obligation 
or demand is due and payable, in the sense that 
it is defined sufficiently to be capable of enforce-
ment." 
If the statute of limitations begins to run when the 
tanse of action accrues, when does the cause accrue~ 
In addition to Crofoot v. Thatcher and Joselyn, supra, 
other Utah cases bearing on the point are State Tax 
Comrn. v. Spanish Fork, 99 U. 177, 100 P.2d 575, "The 
question is then, when did the cause of action accrue~ 
The general rule is that it accrnes at the time it becomes 
remedial in the courts, that is when the claim is in such 
('Ondition that the courts can proceed and give judgment 
if the claim is established ... ordinarily a cause of action 
for a debt begins to run when the debt is due and pay-
able because at that time an action can be maintained to 
enforcP it." Wilson vs. W cber Co., 100 U. 141, 111 P.2d 
147 (Suit against government for refund of taxes, with 
statute requiring claim to be made before lawsuit can 
hn filed and holding that cause of action accrues not 
wlwn there is a liability, but only when liability is in 
~mrh a position that suit can be filed); Last Clear Chance 
Ra11ch Co. v. Erickson, 82 U. 475, 25 P.2d 952 (Contract 
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for conveyance of stock "forthwith." Question of fact 
as to time meant by "forthwith," and statute starts to 
run from such time.) 
1 Am J ur 2d, Actions §89, p. 618 states, "Thus, in 
the case of a contract calling for the payment of money, 
there can be no action at law commenced for the recovery 
of the money before it becomes payable in accordance 
with the terms of the contract." 
An action for payment of money on an oral con-
tract, if commenced prematurely, will be dismissed, be-
cause the cause of action has not accrued. Bowers v. 
Bowers, 99 S.W. 2d 334 (Texas); Werber v. Atkinson, 
84 A. 2d 111 (D.C., 1951). 
In sum, plaintiff had a claim against defendants as 
of the date of the loans. She did not have a cause of 
action until the claim was overdue. Determination of 
the time when the claim -was due is a question of fact. 
The question itself is rather limited, because defendants 
deny the existence of a loan at all, so can't state a time 
when payment was due. The only testimony is plaintiff's, 
to the effect that she did not expect full repayment for 
up to five years, and that she had received payment 
during the interim in part, as she had requested it, by 
free groceries from John during 1963 and 1964, and 
cash payments by George during 1964 and 1967. It would 
be a great hardship on plaintiff, and a dangerous con-
struction of the statutf) of limitations, to rule that a 
party not expecting full payment on a claim for a number 
of years, and receiving partial payments as demanded 
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during that time, is subject to the statute of limitations 
from the date of the contract. 
POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT AS TO DEFENDANT, GEORGE KOU-
N ALIS, BECAUSE THERE WAS AN ISSUE OF 
FACT AS TO WHETHER MONIES HE PAID TO 
PLAINTIFF IN 1964 AND 1967 TOLLED THE STAT-
UTE OF LIMITATIONS. 
George admits that he paid to plaintiff, by check, 
$100.00 in 1964 (the time of year is not clear in the 
depositions of the parties), and $50.00 in 1967. (George 
depos. p. 12, L. 18-19) He admits that he made the pay-
ments because, "I felt a little obligated" (George depos. 
p. 13, L. 8; p. 14, L. 7-8; p. 14, L. 25-p. 15, L. 3), that 
he would have repaid his brother John for the money 
if John had pressed him, but that he knew the true 
source of the money was plaintiff. (George depos. p. 16, 
L. 9-15) 
Plaintiff claims these payments to be payments on 
her loan to George. ( Pltf. depos. p. 18, L. 15-20; p. 27, 
L. 14-19) 
78-12-25 ( 1), U CA, 1953, provides a four year limi-
tation on an oral contract, but 78-12-44, UCA, 1953, pro-
vides that payment of "any part of principal or inter-
e~t ... " restarts the limitation period. Holloway v. 
Wetzer, 86 U. 387, 45 P. 2d 565; Crompton. v. Jenson, 78 
U. 55, 1 P. 2d 242. 
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In light of the foregoing facts and law, it is difficult 
to understand how thP trial court, other than hy inad-
vertence, could have included George in a summary judg-
ment based on the statute of limitations, when George 
admits payments within four years and admits that they 
were made from a sense of obligation on the loan. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT WHEN THERE WERE UN-
RESOLVED ISSUES OF FACT WHICH WOULD 
DETERMINE THE RESULT OF THE CASE. 
Points I and II of this brief state unresolved issues. 
Rule 56 ( c) URCP provides: 
"MOTION AND PROCEEDINGS THEREON. The 
motion shall be served at least 10 days from the time 
fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to tlw 
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The 
judgment sounght shall be rendered forthwith if the 
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, 
show that t71erc is 110 gcm1i11e issue as to any material 
fact and that the nioving party is entitled to a judgment 
as a matter of la'"° A summary judgment, interlocnton' 
in character, may be rendered on the issue of liability 
alon<' although there is a gPnnine issne as to the amount 
of damages." (emphasis add{:'d) 
Utah law is well settled that a slm1mar)- judgment 
shall he granted only if there is no genuine issue as to 
an)- material facts, and in wt>ighing facts, the imrt.1· 
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against whom the summary judgment is sought, has the 
benefit of having the evidence considered in the light 
most favorable to him. Morris v. Farnsworth Motel, 
123 U. 289, 259 P. 2d 297; Whitman v. W. T. Grant Co., 
16 U. 2d 81, 395 P. 2d 918; Young v. Felornia, 121 U. 646, 
244 p. 2d 862. 
As to John, there is one issue, to wit: whether there 
is an issue of fact as to when the loans were in default 
and the statute of limitations began to run, in consider-
ation of plaintiff's testimony that she did not consider 
payment due for a number of years. 
As to George, there is the same issue, and a second 
issue, to wit: whether payments he made within four 
year of filing of the complaint were gifts or payment 
on the loan. 
These issues could not be determined as a matter 
of law because they involve factual disputes. 
Respectfully submitted, 
SAMUEL KING 
409 Boston Building 
11 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
and Appellant 
